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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930097-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
SEAN P. McFADDEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a denial of defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea and the resulting conviction for 
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1991), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Is actual knowledge of the collateral consequence of 
possible deportation a prerequisite for the entry of a knowing 
and voluntary guilty plea? 
Was defendant, a resident alien with Canadian 
citizenship, denied effective assistance of counsel solely 
because his attorney did not inform him that by pleading guilty 
defendant might be subject to the collateral consequence of 
deportation? 
Both of the issues presented on appeal arise in the 
context of the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty. Such orders are typically reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Truiillo-
Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992) . 
In this case, the trial court expressly ruled that, as 
a matter of law, defendant was not entitled to relief because 
potential deportation is a collateral consequence that does not 
implicate the voluntariness of a guilty plea. (See R. 262 where 
court adopts holdings to that effect from other jurisdictions.) 
In its brief, the State asks this Court to hold that, as a matter 
of law, an accused need not be informed of the potential 
collateral consequence of deportation in order for a guilty plea 
to be knowing and voluntary. Similarly, the State urges this 
Court to rule that, as a matter of law, a defense counsel's 
failure to advise a defendant of the possibility of deportation 
cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Such rules of law are purely legal conclusions that are 
reviewed for correctness with no deference accorded the trial 
court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Accordingly, if this Court determines that the trial court 
adopted the correct rule of law, then it cannot be said the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
In the event this Court declines the State's request to 
adopt its proposed rules of law (or declines to reach the issue), 
then it must review the trial court's additional ruling on the 
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merits of defendant's claim. In so doing, the trial court's 
factual findings on such issues as witness credibility should be 
reviewed for clear error. Id. at 935-36. Only if this Court 
then concludes that the facts as found by the trial court are 
sufficient to establish that trial counsel was ineffective can it 
be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed; which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated 
sexual assault, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-405 (1990) (R. 6). After the State had presented 
all, or virtually all, of its evidence against defendant at a 
jury trial, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the 
lesser included offense of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1990), (R. 77-
83, 213). After an extensive plea colloquy, the trial court 
accepted defendant's plea and discharged the jury (R. 120-145). 
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to 
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withdraw his guilty plea in which he claimed he had no 
alternative but to enter a plea to the lesser offense because his 
trial counsel's representation was so inadequate that any hope of 
being acquitted had been dashed. Defendant also requested that 
he be appointed independent counsel to represent him in his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 89-90, 102 at 1-12) . The 
trial court denied both motions and sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Penitentiary and ordered that he pay restitution, the amount of 
which was to be determined by the Board of Pardons (R. 87-88, 102 
at 33) . 
Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his 
motion for appointment of independent counsel. This Court 
reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
appoint replacement counsel and remanded the case to the trial 
court with directions that defendant be appointed independent 
counsel to represent him on his motion to withdraw his plea R. 
112) . 
Proceeding with new counsel, defendant renewed his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In his renewed motion, 
defendant alleged for the first time that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to inform defendant that by 
pleading guilty he might be subject to deportation. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court again denied defendant's 
motion (R. 147-97). Defendant appealed, but this Court dismissed 
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because no final appealable 
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order had been entered (R. 204). 
After obtaining his third and present counsel, 
defendant asked that an appealable order be entered by the trial 
court. The' trial court entered adverse findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and denied defendant's motion in a signed 
order (R. 210). Defendant then appealed that order. Prior to 
briefing, however, defendant sought and received an order of 
remand under Utah R. App. P. 23B so that additional evidence 
could be heard on the issue of whether his trial counsel was 
ineffective (R. 229). At the completion of that hearing, the 
trial court entered findings of fact as required under rule 23B. 
Apparently satisfied that all ineffectiveness issues had been 
fully litigated before the trial court, defendant proceeded on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The material facts of this case are undisputed. 
Defendant is a resident alien with Canadian citizenship 
(R. 149). Although a Canadian citizen, defendant entered the 
United States in 1961 at the age of two after being adopted by 
his parents -- both of whom were citizens of the United States. 
He has lived in this country since 1961 and is the father of 
children who are United States citizens (R. 156-57). 
Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-405 
(1990) (R. 6) . After the State had presented nearly all of its 
evidence against defendant at a jury trial, defendant entered a 
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negotiated plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of 
forcible sexual abuse (R. 77-83, , 213, 254) . 
Defendant's trial counsel knew defendant "had a prior 
sexual offense related conviction" and that he "was from Canada" 
(R. 250). However, the record does not indicate that counsel had 
any reason to know that defendant was a resident alien as opposed 
to a naturalized citizen. Counsel did not inform defendant that 
by pleading guilty he might be rendered deportable (R. 250-51). 
At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, 
defendant testified that he knew he could petition for United 
States citizenship based on his relationship to his parents and 
children, but said he had never filed such a petition because he 
"never felt the need to" (R. 158). He raised the issue of his 
immigration status when he learned he would be subject to 
deportation after his conviction in this case is "final" (157-
59) . 
As of the date of the hearing below, defendant had not 
petitioned for citizenship (R. 158). Rather, defendant contended 
below, as he does on appeal, that had he known that a guilty plea 
might make him subject to deportation he would have insisted on 
going to trial. 
In addition to making extensive findings from the bench 
(R. 191-96), the trial court entered detailed written findings of 
fact (R. 210-15). When defendant moved for reconsideration of 
the court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, the court 
entered a "summary decision and order" of denial (R. 262-64). 
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(Copies of all of the trial court's findings and orders are 
attached hereto as Addendum A.) The trial court "adopt [ed] the 
holding of those case which do not require defense counsel to 
inform a defendant of the potential deportation consequences 
flowing from a guilty plea" (R. 262). In addition, the trial 
court found that defendant's testimony was not credible. It 
found that defendant, having seen the State's evidence, pleaded 
guilty to the lesser offense solely to avoid being convicted of a 
more serious charge and that he would have pleaded guilty even if 
he had been informed about the possibility of deportation. 
Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, as well as defendant's motion to 
reconsider the denial of that motion (R. 191-96, 210-15, 262-64) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Deportation proceedings are civil actions that are 
separate and distinct from criminal prosecutions. As such, the 
possibility of deportation is a collateral consequence, not a 
direct consequence, of entering a guilty plea. Because actual 
knowledge of collateral consequences is not a prerequisite to the 
entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the fact that 
defendant was allegedly unaware of that he might be subject to 
deportation does not, as a matter of law, render his guilty plea 
involuntary. 
Similarly, because defense attorneys are under no 
constitutionally derived duty to inform defendants of the 
collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea, defense 
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counsel's alleged failure to advise defendant of possible 
deportation does not constitute deficient performance under the 
first prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 105 
S.Ct. 2052 (1984), test for ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. In any event, defendant has not demonstrated a 
reasonable likelihood that he would have insisted upon going to 
trial had he been told of the possible deportation consequences 
of entering his guilty plea. Indeed, the court expressly found 
otherwise. Accordingly, this Court uphold the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 
affirm his conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM THAT, BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW 
THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA MIGHT RENDER HIM 
DEPORTABLE, HIS PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED 
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea because that plea was entered knowingly 
and voluntarily. Defendant argues only that because "he was 
unaware he could be deported from the United States for pleading 
guilty to forcible sexual abuse . . . his plea could not have 
been a knowing and intelligent waiver of a known constitutional 
right." Br. of Defendant at 29. As demonstrated below, possible 
deportation is a collateral consequence about which a defendant 
need not have actual knowledge in order for a guilty plea to be 
deemed knowing and voluntary. The trial court's denial of 
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defendant's motion to withdraw his plea should therefore be 
affirmed. 
Defendant has never argued that the trial court's plea 
colloquy was inadequate under Utah R. Crim. P. 11. As this Court 
noted in State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah App. 1992, 
however, a "trial court's compliance with Rule 11 does not 
foreclose the possibility the court abused its discretion in 
refusing defendant's motion if his plea was in fact involuntary." 
The only claim advanced by defendant is that he had to have 
actual knowledge of his possible deportation in order to enter a 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea. As demonstrated below, that 
argument lacks legal merit. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that an 
accused must be "fully aware of the direct consequences" of a 
guilty plea. Bradv v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) 
(emphasis added). As Bradv implies, "[c]ertain consequences of a 
guilty plea are 'collateral' rather than direct, however, and 
need not be explained to the defendant in order to ensure that 
the plea is voluntary." United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 
38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted). See also United States 
v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("We presume that 
the Supreme Court tin Bradvl meant what it said when it used the 
word 'direct'; by doing so, it excluded collateral 
consequences."); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 
1989) ("If the consequence flowing from the plea is 'collateral,' 
then the defendant need not be informed of it before entering the 
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plea."). 
The collateral consequences of a guilty plea "may 
include the loss of civil service employment, the right to vote 
and to travel freely abroad, the right to a driver's license, and 
the right to possess firearms." United States v. Del Rosario, 
902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Deportation 
also is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea because, "it is 
well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and 
severe for the alien, is not a punishment." Mahler v. Eby, 264 
U.S. 32, 39, 44 S.Ct. 283, 286 (1924). Rather, "[d]eportation, 
however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified 
as a civil rather than criminal procedure[.]" Harisiades v. 
Shauahnessv, 392 U.S. 580, 594, 72 S.Ct. 512, 521 (1952). 
In recognition of the fact that "potential deportation 
is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea[,]" federal courts 
addressing the issue have uniformly held that trial judges are 
not required to inform a defendant of the possibility of 
deportation in order for defendant's plea to be deemed voluntary. 
See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177 (3rd Cir. 
1988). See also United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F.Supp. 586, 
589 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Russell, 686 F.2d at 39; Fruchtman v. 
Kenton, 531' F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976). United States v. 
Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2nd. Cir. 1975); Downs-Morgan v. 
United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1537-38 (11th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (all holding that 
trial judges are not required to inform an accused of possible 
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deportation). As discussed below, sound policy reasons support 
this position. 
Requiring a trial court to inform an accused of 
potential deportation as part of a plea colloquy would open 
Pandora's box: 
The collateral consequences flowing from a 
plea of guilty are so manifold that any rule 
requiring a district judge to advise a 
defendant of such a consequence as 
[deportation] would impose an unmanageable 
burden on the trial judge and 'only sow the 
seeds for later collateral attack.' United 
States v. Sherman, 474 F.2d 303, 305 (9th 
Cir. 1973) . 
Fruchtman, 531 F.2d at 949. It is unreasonable to expect judges 
to "draw up a complete list of possible consequences" and require 
the judge to advise an accused of each possible collateral 
consequence. Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 467 (2nd 
Cir. 1974). As the Michel court emphasized: 
To require that [a trial judge] anticipate 
the multifarious peripheral contingencies 
which may affect the defendant's civil 
liabilities, his eligibility for a variety of 
societal benefits, his civil rights or his 
right to remain in this country, all of which 
might give rise to later claims that the plea 
was not voluntary in the absence of informed 
consent, has not been required in our 
jurisprudence, constitutionally or otherwise. 
Id. at 466. 
The need to draw manageable boundaries around what 
consequences an accused must comprehend in order for his guilty 
plea to be valid also is evidenced by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. For 
instance, one of the objectives of rule 11 "is to insure that a 
defendant knows what minimum sentence the judge must impose and 
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what maximum sentence the judge may impose." Notes of the 
Advisory Committee on Rule 11, 1974 Amendment (emphasis added). 
Deportation, however, "is not the sentence of the court which 
accept[s] the plea but of another agency over which the trial 
judge has no control and for which he has no responsibility." 
Michel, 507 F.2d at 465. Accordingly, a trial judge need not 
inform a defendant of possible deportation because it is not part 
of "the punishment that he is meting out[.]" Id. at 466 
(emphasis in original). 
The concerns expressed by the courts in Michel and 
Fruchtman are legitimate. Simply put, no rational distinction 
can be made that justifies requiring judges to advise an accused 
of some collateral consequences and not other collateral 
consequences. Because requiring actual knowledge of all possible 
collateral consequences in order for a guilty plea to be deemed 
valid is an impossible burden to satisfy, the wiser course is to 
strictly adhere to the Brady requirement of fully informing an 
accused of the direct consequences of his plea while refusing to 
expand the plea colloquy to include discussion of possible 
collateral consequences. 
Defendant, however, properly notes that Florida 
requires trial judges to advise defendants of possible 
deportation. See Defendant's brief at 27 n.20. As defendant 
further notes, Florida's requirement is based on a rule of 
criminal procedure. See Fla. R. Crim P. 3.172(c) (8) (1993). It 
appears that only a few other states have enacted similar rules 
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or statutes. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1016.5 (1993); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. 54-lj (1993); Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 278 § 29D (1993); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.385 (1993); Wash. Rev. § 10.40.200 (1993). 
However, no court appears to have imposed the requirement urged 
by defendant as a matter of constitutional, or even common, law. 
Nor should this court. Rather, the imposition of such a 
requirement should come, if at all, from the Utah Supreme Court 
via revision of Utah R. Crim. P. 11. 
The direct/collateral consequences distinction is 
manageable and is in keeping with the Brady requirement that an 
accused be informed of the "direct" consequences of his guilty 
plea. Accordingly, this Court should follow the majority and 
better reasoned view that, as a matter of law, actual knowledge 
of the collateral consequence of possible deportation is not a 
prerequisite for the entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty 
plea. 
POINT II 
FAILURE TO ADVISE A DEFENDANT OF THE POSSIBLE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE OF DEPORTATION DOES 
CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel. 
In order to demonstrate otherwise, defendant "must show (1) his 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) there 
exists a reasonable probability that, absent the deficient 
conduct, the verdict would have been more favorable to 
defendant." State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 858 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citing State v. Frame, 723 p.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986), and State 
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v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah App. 1989)). 
This two-pronged test is drawn from the United States 
Supreme Court case of Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 105 S.Ct. 2052, 
and was summarized in Frame: 
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant 
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's 
representation falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. . . . Defendant 
must prove that specific, identified acts or 
omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance. The 
claim may not be speculative, but must be a 
demonstrative reality, sufficient to overcome 
the strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and exercised "reasonable 
professional . . . judgment." And, an 
unfavorable result does not compel a 
conclusion of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.... 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be 
prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough 
to claim that the alleged errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome or could 
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact 
finders. To be found sufficiently 
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively 
show that a "reasonable probability" exists 
that, but for counsel's error, the result 
would have been different. We have defined 
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient 
to undermine the confidence in the 
reliability of the verdict. 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 (footnote and citations omitted). 
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985), 
the Supreme held that the Strickland test applied with equal 
force to "ineffectiveness claims arising out of the plea 
process." 474 U.S. at 57, 105 S.Ct. at 370. In addition to 
requiring proof of "unreasonable" performance falling outside 
"the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 
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cases [,]" in order to obtain relief in the plea setting, "the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial." 474 U.S. at 56, 59, 105 
S.Ct. at 368, 371 (internal quotation marks, citations and 
footnote omitted). Defendant in this case has failed to carry 
his burden under either prong of Strickland as defined in Hill. 
1. The Sixth Amendment Does Not Require Defense 
Counsel To Advise A Defendant of the 
Potential Collateral Consequences of Entering 
a Guilty Plea. 
As discussed under Point I above, trial judges are 
under no duty to advise an accused of the possible collateral 
consequence of deportation before accepting a guilty plea. 
Similarly, a defense counsel's failure to advise a defendant of 
possible deportation cannot constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel: 
[A]ctual knowledge of the collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea is not a 
prerequisite to the entry of a knowing and 
intelligent plea. Therefore, a defendant's 
lack of knowledge of those collateral 
consequences cannot affect the voluntariness 
of the plea. Accordingly, counsel's failure 
to advise defendant of the collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to 
the level of constitutionally ineffective 
assistance. 
United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(citations omitted). 
As the United States Fifth Circuit Court recently 
observed, fl[t]he [federal] courts that have addressed the 
question of counsel's failure to warn of possible deportation 
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[arising from a guilty plea] have uniformly held that deportation 
is a collateral consequence of the criminal process and hence the 
failure to advise [the accused of possible deportation] does not 
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel." United States v. 
Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993). Accord Campbell, 778 F.2d at 
768; Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992), 
cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 1869 (1993); United States v. Del 
Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied 498 U.S. 942 
(1990); United States v. deFreitas, 865 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 
1989); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990); U.S. v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 338 
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7-8 (4th 
Cir. 1988); United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 
1985); Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 
1977); Nunez-Cordero v. United States, 533 F.2d 723, 726 (1st 
Cir. 1976); United States v. Santileses, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d 
Cir. 1975) . 
While deportation may be a harsh collateral 
consequence, 
a deportation proceeding is a civil 
proceeding which may result from a criminal 
prosecution, but is not a part of or enmeshed 
in the criminal proceeding. It is collateral 
to the criminal prosecution. While the Sixth 
Amendment assures an accused of effective 
assistance of counsel in criminal 
prosecutions, this assurance does not extend 
to collateral aspects of the prosecution. 
George, 869 F.2d at 337; accord Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d at 944. 
Further, "[t]o hold otherwise would place an unreasonable burden 
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on defense counsel to ascertain and advise of the collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea." Yearwood, 863 F.2d at 8. In 
sum, deportation is only one of many possible collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea, and judicial imposition on defense 
counsel of an affirmative duty to investigate such consequences 
would unfairly burden defense counsel and unnecessarily 
jeopardize valid guilty pleas. 
Some federal courts have, however, recognized one 
exception to the general rule of no ineffectiveness, and that is 
in cases where counsel inaccurately represents that the defendant 
will not be subject to deportation. See e.g., Downs-Morgan v. 
U.S., 765 F.2d, 1534, 1540-41 (11th Cir. 1985); Campbell, 778 
F.2d at 768-69; Santelises, 509 F.2d at 704. In such cases, the 
usual remedy is a remand to determine whether the 
misrepresentation prejudiced the defendant, particularly when 
deportation may entail exceptionally harsh consequences and the 
defendant has a colorable claim of innocence. Downs-Morgan, 765 
F.2d at 1541. That exception is inapplicable in this case 
because defendant has not asserted that his counsel affirmatively 
misrepresented the possible deportation consequences of his plea. 
Nor has defendant asserted a colorable claim of innocence. 
Most state courts have adopted the federal view that 
counsel is not constitutionally required to inform a defendant of 
possible deportation. See, e.g, Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 
28, 31 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Boodhoo. 593 N.Y.S.2d 882, 
883 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Ovekova v. State, 558 So.2d 990, 990 
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(Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); Dalev v. State, 487 A.2d 320, 322-23 
(Md. Ct. App. 1985); Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 
1987); State v. Santos, 401 N.W.2d 856, 858-59 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1987); People v. Dor, 505 N.Y.S.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1986); Tafova v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 252 (Alaska 1972), cert, 
denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973). 
Defendant relies heavily on opinions from those few 
states that have held that the failure to advise a defendant of 
potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea may 
constitute ineffective assistance. See Defendant's brief at 15-
21 and authority cited therein. Defendant's reliance on those 
cases is misplaced because most of them have been overruled. See 
People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736, 741 (111. 1991), disapproving 
People v. Padilla. 502 N.E.2d 1182 (111. Ct. App. 1986); 
Commonwealth v. Frometa. 555 A.2d 92, 94 (Pa. 1989), overruling 
Commonwealth v. Wellington, 451 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1982); State v. 
Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960, 961 (Fla. 1987), overruling Edwards v. 
State, 393 So.2d 597 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981). 
Defendant's reliance on opinions from other states 
vacating a defendant's guilty plea is similarly misplaced 
because, unlike Utah, those states have rules or statutes 
requiring trial courts to advise a defendant of the possibility 
of deportation. That requirement puts the question of 
deportation squarely at issue during a plea colloquy. See, e.g., 
State v. Baeza, 496 N.W,2d 233, 238 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) 
(permitting defendant to withdraw guilty plea pursuant to state 
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statute after trial court failed to advise of deportation); 
Commonwealth v. Mahedeo, 491 N.E.2d 601, 603-04 (Mass. 1986) 
(same); People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 334-36) (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987) (holding counsel's failure to investigate deportation 
consequences was ineffective assistance); Lyons v. Pearce, 6 94 
P.2d 969, 977-78 (Or. 1985) (holding counsel was ineffective due 
to failure to request judicial recommendation against 
deportation). 
Absent a rule or statute requiring notice of 
deportation consequences as part of a plea colloquy, it appears 
that Colorado is the lone state to impose an affirmative duty on 
counsel to investigate and advise defendants about the collateral 
consequence of deportation. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 
1987). Cf.' State v. Dalev, 487 A.2d 320, 322 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) 
("In the absence of such a statute . . ., this court is 
constrained to follow the overwhelming weight of authority in 
this country that the trial court's failure to advise Petitioner 
of possible deportation proceedings did not affect the 
voluntariness of his guilty plea."). 
Understandably, defendant relies on Pozo, and at first 
blush it appears to support defendant's ineffectiveness claim 
insofar as the court held that the "potential deportation 
consequences of guilty pleas in criminal proceedings . . . are 
material to critical phases of such proceedings." Id. at 529. 
On that basis, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when 
counsel is aware that the defendant is an alien, " [counsel] may 
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reasonably be required to investigate relevant immigration law." 
Id. 
The Colorado court imposed that duty because of the 
harshness of deportation and because, at that time, a trial judge 
could make a judicial recommendation against deportation within 
thirty days of sentencing, which was binding on the U.S. Attorney 
General. Id. at 528-29. The court reasoned that, because the 
trial court could take steps to avoid the defendant's 
deportation, that made deportation more "material" than other 
collateral consequences, triggering counsel's duty to investigate 
immigration law. That rationale is no longer valid. Congress, 
in passing the 1990 Immigration Act, repealed the former 
statutory provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b), allowing for a judicial 
recommendation against deportation. See Act Effective November 
29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050. See 
also United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1991), 
cert, denied 112 S. Ct. 1487 (1992) (rejecting ex post facto 
challenge to repeal of judicial recommendation against 
deportation); United States v. Koziel, 954 F.2d 831, 832 (2d Cir. 
1992) (same). 
Moreover, the Pozo court did not hold that failure to 
advise a defendant of possible deportation necessarily 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, it held 
that, even when counsel is aware of defendant's alien status and 
fails to conduct research into the question of deportation, that 
finding "would not render the attorney's performance inadequate 
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in the absence of a finding that such conduct resulted in 
prejudice to [the defendant.]" Pozo, 746 P.2d at 528-29.1 
Irrespective of the wisdom of Pozo, it is of little 
assistance to defendant because he has failed to establish that 
his trial counsel knew defendant was not a United States citizen. 
Rather, the affidavit drafted by defendant's current counsel and 
signed by his trial counsel indicates only that his trial counsel 
knew defendant was "from Canada" (R. 250). Defendant elected not 
call his trial counsel at the hearing on his claim of 
ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the record provides no support for 
the conclusion that defendant's trial counsel knew that defendant 
was a resident alien or whether he instead was under the 
impression that defendant was a naturalized citizen. Because 
defendant has failed to establish that his trial counsel knew 
about defendant's alien status at the time defendant entered his 
guilty plea, Pozo does little to advance defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In sum, virtually every court that has addressed the 
1
 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rovira argued that "[t]he 
majority opens the door to innumerable challenges to pleas based 
on the defendant's ignorance of other serious collateral 
consequences." Pozo, 746 P.2d at 532-33 (Rovira, J., 
dissenting). It appears that Justice Rovira's concerns have come 
to fruition in Colorado. See People v. Garcia. 815 P.2d 937 
(Colo. 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992) (en banc) 
(Vollack, J., dissenting) (noting majority opinion, holding that 
counsel's alleged advice that criminal guilty plea would bar 
subsequent civil action required remand to determine prejudice, 
was an expansion of Pozo "signalling an open invitation for 
defendants to challenge guilty pleas based on any number of 
collateral consequences," and imposed "impossible burden" on 
defense counsel). 
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question of whether a trial counsel's failure to advise a 
defendant of possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea 
has disposed of that claim under Strickland's performance prong 
without addressing the issue of prejudice. This Court should 
likewise adopt the rule that, as a matter of law, a defense 
counsel's alleged failure to advise a defendant of possible 
deportation" cannot give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness 
because the right to counsel "does not extend to collateral 
aspects of a prosecution." George, 869 F.2d at 337. 
2. Defendant has Failed to Establish 
That He Was Prejudiced by Counsel's 
Alleged Failure to Advise Him that 
he Might be Subject to Deportation 
Were he to Enter a Plea of Guilty. 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim under the Strickland prejudice prong and 
forgive defendant's failure to establish that his trial counsel 
was aware of defendant's resident alien status, it should still 
affirm defendant's conviction. As demonstrated below, defendant 
has failed to properly challenge the trial court's determination 
that defendant would have pled guilty even if he had been aware 
of the possible deportation consequences of such a plea. 
In the instant case, the trial court found that 
defendant's testimony at the hearing on his motion to withdraw 
his plea was not credible in any respect (R. 191-96). At the end 
of the hearing below, the trial judge made the following comments 
about defendant's claim that he would not have pled guilty had he 
known that it might render him subject him to deportation: 
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Now, I have gone through all the reasons 
why [defendant], today,. tells me he wants to 
withdraw his plea of guilty. Except for this 
one about the potential loss of -- alleged 
potential loss of his right to be in the 
United States upon his release from prison. 
And I must consider that in the context 
of everything he's told me so far today, all 
of which so seriously challenges his 
credibility that, frankly, there is not a lot 
that Mr. McFadden could say that is not 
subject to substantial challenge on the basis 
of his credibility. 
He tells me that he would not have 
entered a plea of guilty had he known th[at] 
this could affect his status as a resident 
alien. I do not believe that testimony. And 
for that reason alone it is sufficient for me 
to deny the motion to withdraw on those 
grounds. 
I might add that there is really no 
sufficient basis on the record, factual 
basis, to show to me th[at] there is any risk 
whatsoever to the defendant that he would 
lose his right to continue to reside in 
somewhere in the United States. 
I mean, we have an unnamed, undefined 
agent coming out to the prison; no petitions, 
no letters, nothing like that [to 
substantiate defendant's claim that he is 
going to be deported.] 
R. 196. See Addendum A. 
In its subsequently entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the trial court emphasized that !l[d]uring 
examination by the court and cross-examination by the State, the 
defendant was evasive, self-serving and [gave answers that were] 
inconsistent with earlier statements to the court" (R. 212). The 
court concluded that defendant's testimony was "untrustworthy and 
incredible" (R. 212). It is also clear that the court was 
particularly suspicious of defendant's claim that he would not 
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have pled guilty but for the alleged errors of his trial counsel: 
The defendant had just listened to all, or 
virtually all, of the State's evidence in a 
trial which may have resulted in his 
conviction of a first degree felony with a 
minimum mandatory sentence of 5, 10, or 15 
years to life. The defendant entered his 
plea after a full and free discussion with 
the court about its meaning, his state of 
mind, and his understanding. He said he 
understood, that his decision was voluntary 
and that he wanted to plead guilty, He now 
says that he lied to the court, that he 
didn't understand, and that he was misled. 
There is no reason to suppose his latest 
version is anything but a case of acute 
buyer's remorse conjured up from prison. 
There is no legal reason to allow him to 
withdraw his plea of guilty. 
R. 212-13. See Addendum A. 
Finally, in its order denying defendant's motion to 
reconsider defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, the 
trial court further explained that "defendant's demeanor and 
statements at the time his plea was tendered and accepted 
indicated to this court that his sole motive was to avoid what he 
perceived was a likely jury verdict of guilt. As a consequence, 
disclosure of a possible deportation would not have changed 
defendant's' decision to plead guilty" (R. 263). See Addendum A. 
Defendant assails the trial court's analysis and 
particularly takes issue with the fact that the court denied his 
motion to withdraw his plea because, among other reasons, "the 
court was convinced [defendant] was guilty of the charged crime." 
Defendant's brief at 29. As demonstrated below, however, the 
trial court's analysis is in keeping with that employed by other 
courts addressing the issue of prejudice in similar 
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ineffectiveness claims. 
Those few courts that have elected to examine the issue 
of prejudice arising from an attorney's failure to advise a 
defendant of potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea 
have focused their inquiry on the strength of the government's 
case to determine whether the defendant's motivation for the 
guilty plea was the prospect of leniency in light of strong 
evidence of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 
101, 105 (3d Cir. 1989); Huante, 571 N.E.2d at 742-43; In re 
Peters, 750 P.2d 643, 646-47 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
Chung, 510 A.2d 72, 79-80 (N.J. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Dor, 
505 N.Y.S. 317, 320-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); State v. Arvanitis, 
522 N.E.2d 1089, 1094-95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
A mere assertion by a defendant that, but for counsel's 
failure to advise, the defendant would have elected to proceed to 
trial is insufficient to establish prejudice. Id.; Huante, 571 
N.E. 2d at 742, Peters, 750 P.2d at 647. Rather, a defendant 
must demonstrate that his counsel's failure to advise of the 
possible deportation consequences influenced the decision to 
plead guilty because, absent such influence, a defendant's plea 
cannot be deemed involuntary. Arvanitis, 522 N.E.2d at 1095. In 
short, the defendant must show that "remaining in the United 
States was an important part of his plea decision. . . . made in 
reasonable reliance upon an ignorance of the fact that he would 
be deported." Id. 
In order to evaluate whether deportation would have 
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been an important consideration in a defendant's decision to 
plead guilty, courts review the government's case against the 
defendant to determine whether the defendant's desire for 
leniency outweighed any possibility that the defendant would be 
willing to take his chances on acquittal to avoid deportation. 
Id. The stronger the case against the defendant, the more likely 
that deportation would not have been a relevant consideration in 
entering a guilty plea, because "[defendant] would have pled 
guilty anyway or, had he not done so, been found guilty after 
trial." Nino, 878 F.2d at 105. 
In this case, the trial judge observed "all, or 
virtually all, of the State's evidence" before accepting 
defendant's guilty plea and determined that "defendant's demeanor 
and statements at the time his plea was tendered and accepted 
indicated to this court that his sole motive was to avoid what he 
perceived was a likely jury verdict of guilt. As a consequence, 
disclosure of a possible deportation would not have changed 
defendant's decision to plead guilty" (R. 212, 263). See 
Addendum A. 
In order to challenge the trial court's finding, 
defendant must demonstrate that the case against him was so weak 
that he would have been willing to take his chances with the jury 
in hopes of avoiding possible deportation instead of entering a 
plea agreement that protected him from a minimum mandatory prison 
term. Defendant has made no effort to make such a showing. 
Indeed, he has not even made the trial transcript part of the 
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record on appeal. Absent that record material, it is impossible 
for this court to review the trial court's rulings. They must 
therefore be presumed to be correct. Cf. State v. Robbins, 709 
P.2d 771 (Utah 1985) (in the absence of a transcript on appeal, a 
reviewing court will presume regularity of the proceeding below). 
Finally, defendant has not even established that he is 
likely to be deported. Rather, he has only shown that he is 
"deportable." It may well be that innumerable resident aliens 
are "deportable" but nevertheless are allowed to remain in the 
Untied States. As the trial court emphasized, defendant 
presented no credible evidence to show that the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service was contemplating deportation (R. 196). 
Rather, he testified that some unnamed, unidentified person with 
an INS badge told him they would deport him. As for the 
affidavits of defendant's attorney and his attorney's secretary, 
the only action that they indicate INS has taken is to create a 
file on defendant and that, in any event, no deportation action 
is commenced against any convicted alien until that conviction is 
final -- "after the alien has exhausted his first appeal of 
right" (R. 244-48). Nothing in the record indicates that 
defendant attempted to secure a copy of that file or to have an 
INS representative testify at the 23B hearing conducted below. 
Such evidence would have shed light on the question of whether 
INS is likely to take any action against defendant. Given that 
defendant has resided in the United States since 1961 when he 
entered the country at the age of two, is the adopted child of 
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two United States citizens, and is the father of children who are 
United States citizens, it may well be that INS will not seek his 
deportation. Absent some tangible proof that was "likely" and 
not merely possible, the trial court properly rejected 
defendant's claim that if his counsel had apprised him of the 
possible deportation consequences of his guilty plea he would 
have insisted on allowing the case to be submitted to the jury. 
Accordingly, even if this Court were to reach the issue of 
prejudice, it should affirm the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should adopt the 
rule that an accused need not have actual knowledge of potential 
collateral consequences of a guilty plea in order for that plea 
to be knowing and voluntary. Similarly, this Court should hold 
that defense counsel are under no constitutional duty to advise 
defendant's about potential collateral consequences of pleading 
guilty. These are sound rules and will have the salutary effect 
of giving litigants reliable guidance in the future. On that 
basis, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea should be upheld, and defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^^day of June, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Trial Court's Findings and Order 
MR. COPE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANY FURTHER ARGUMENT? 
MR. ESPARZA: WE WOULD SUBMIT IT , JUDGE. 
THE COURT: MR. COPE. 
MR. COPE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: UNLIKE MOST OF THE MOTIONS TO 
WITHDRAW THAT A JUDGE OF THIS COURT NEEDS TO ADDRESS, 
THIS ONE INVOLVES THE CREDIBILITY AND DEMEANOR OF A 
WITNESS, I.E., MR. MCFADDEN. 
NORMALLY WHEN THIS IS ADDRESSED, IT'S JUST ON 
THE BASIS OF A COLD HARD TRANSCRIPT, AND WHAT WE TRY TO 
DO IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE NECESSARY 
QUESTIONS WERE ASKED AND THE NECESSARY ANSWERS WERE 
RECEIVED. 
BUT AS I INDICATED, THIS IS A LITTLE BIT 
DIFFERENT, BECAUSE WHAT MR. MCFADDEN HAS NOW TOLD ME IS 
THAT THE THINGS THAT HE TOLD ME UNDER OATH ON THE 25TH OF 
APRIL, ARE NOT TRUE. AND I NECESSARILY THEN HAVE TO 
CONSIDER HIS CREDIBILITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE WAS 
TELLING ME THE TRUTH THEN, OR WHETHER HE'S TELLING ME THE 
TRUTH TODAY. 
I NECESSARILY HAVE TO PUT THIS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF WHAT HAPPENED ON THE 25TH OF APRIL, 1991. AND THAT 
IS, THAT MR. MCFADDEN WAS MOST OF THE WAY THROUGH A TRIAL 
IN WHICH HE WAS FACING A CONVICTION ON A MINIMUM 
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1 MANDATORY FOR WHICH HE COULD BE SENT TO PRISON FOR A TERM 
2 OF FIVE, TEN, FIFTEEN YEARS WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT 
3 WOULD BE FOR LIFE. 
4 FURTHERMORE, AS MR. MCFADDEN WAS SITTING HERE, 
5 HE OBVIOUSLY WAS LOOKING INTO THE EYES OF THE SAME JURORS 
6 THAT I WAS LOOKING INTO, EIGHT WOMEN AND ONE MAN. MR. 
7 MCFADDEN PERHAPS SAW SOMETHING THAT I WASN'T LOOKING FOR, 
8 BUT SAW IN THE EYES OF THOSE JURORS THE GREAT POTENTIAL 
9 HE HAD FOR CONVICTION, ALL OF WHICH HAD BEEN EXPLAINED TO 
10 HIM ANYWAY. 
11 IT'S IN THAT CONTEXT, I THINK, THAT I NEED TO 
12 ANALYSE ANY CLAIMS SEEKING TO RID HIMSELF OF THOSE 
13 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA. AND AS I INDICATED, I MUST 
14 ANALYSE THE BASIS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA UNDER 
15 STANDARDS WHICH REQUIRE ME TO LOOK AT THE DEMEANOR AND 
16 CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS, I.E., MR. MCFADDEN. 
17 AND HE TELLS ME TODAY THAT HE LIED TO ME ONCE. 
18 ON ONE SETTING, BUT FOR MULTIPLE TIMES. EVERY ANSWER HE 
19 EVIDENTLY GAVE ME THERE WAS JUST WRONG, AND WAS A LIE. 
20 EVEN THOUGH IT WAS UNDER OATH. 
21 NOW HE ASKS ME BELIEVE HIS STATEMENTS TODAY 
22 WHICH ARE UNDER OATH. HE TELLS ME TODAY THAT ONE REASON 
23 WHY HE WANTS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IS BECAUSE HE DIDN'T 
24 UNDERSTAND THE CONSEQUENCES TO HIS BUSINESS. NOW, WHAT 
25 HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND, AS HE TOLD ME FROM THE WITNESS 
ooisc 
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1 STAIR CHAIR TODAY, IS THAT HE WOULD SUFFER FINANCIAL 
2 REVERSALS AS A RESULT OF ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY. 
3 WELL, I INDICATED TO HIM ON THE RECORD THAT HE 
4 COULD BE REQUIRED TO SERVE A SENTENCE OF ONE TO FIFTEEN 
5 YEARS IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY. WHICH WAS WHEN I TOOK 
6 THE PLEA. DOES THAT MEAN THAT I MUST TELL HIM THAT IF 
7 THAT'S WHAT OCCURS, THEN HE'S GOING TO BE LOCKED UP AND 
8 HE'S NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO ATTEND TO HIS BUSINESS? 
9 EVIDENTLY, MR. MCFADDEN THINKS I ALSO NEED TO 
10 EXPLAIN TO TO HIM WHAT IS SO OBVIOUS THAT IT NEEDS NO 
11 EXPLANATION. 
12 FURTHERMORE, IT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT'S TO BE 
13 RECITED UNDER RULE 11, NOR ANYTHING THAT RISES TO A 
14 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT THAT BOYKEN WOULD REQUIRE ME TO MAKE 
15 INQUIRY OF HIM ON THE RECORD ABOUT THAT TYPE OF MATTER. 
16 I HE ALSO TELLS ME TODAY UNDER OATH THAT HE 
17 DIDN'T KNOW THAT IF HE WERE A CONVICTED FEON THAT HE 
18 COULD NOT GET HIS LICENSE. YET HE JUST NOW TOLD ME UNDER 
19 I OATH THAT TWO YEARS AGO WHEN HE WAS IN THE OFFICE OF THE 
20 DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS, OR DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, THAT 
21 THAT THIS ONE PARTICULAR LADY TOLD HIM ABOUT THE 
22 CONSEQUENCES. 
23 I IT COULD WELL HAVE BEEN THAT HE TUMBLED INTO 
24 GIVING ME THOSE ANSWERS, BUT THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENS 
25 WHEN PEOPLE HAVE TO ANSWER NUMEROUS QUESTIONS BEING 
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1 THROWN AT THEM, SUCH AS MR. MCFADDEN DID TODAY. 
2 I IT IS VERY, VERY, VERY CLEAR FROM THE EVIDENCE 
3 BEFORE ME TODAY THAT MR. MCFADDEN KNEW THERE THERE WERE 
4 CONSEQUENCES IN THE BUSINESS LICENSING, WITH THE 
5 DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, IF ONE WAS A CONVICTED FELON. 
6 FURTHERMORE, I MIGHT INDICATE THAT MY 
7 DISCUSSION OF THAT ASSUMES, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE BEING 
8 BEFORE ME, THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOMEONE TO GET A 
9 LICENSE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE IF THEY ARE A 
10 CONVICTED FELON. 
11 THAT IS NOT AN ASSUMPTION I'LL WILLING TO MAKE, 
12 BUT THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR HAS ASSUMED THAT IS FACT, AND 
13 MR. MC FADDEN HAS INDICATED HIMSELF THAT THAT'S NOT 
14 NECESSARILY SO, BECAUSE YOU CAN BE A CONVICTED FELON, AND 
15 HE WAS, AND STILL HAVE A LICENSE, BECAUSE THERE IS A 
16 WAIVER PROCEDURE. ALL OF WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD. 
17 HE NOW TELLS ME THAT ANOTHER REASON IS THAT HE 
18 DID NOT KNOW HE WOULD HAVE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER, 
19 ON THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY. AND HE SPECIFIC TOLD ME 
20 TODAY ON THE WITNESS STAND THAT THE REASON WHY THAT'S A 
21 PROBLEM IS BECAUSE OF HIS JOB AS A SALESPERSON. 
22 I WELL, THE STATUTE ON THIS INDICATES THAT THE 
23 REGISTRY IS CONFIDENTIAL TO ALL PERSONS EXCEPT FOR LAW 
24 ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, THE STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION, AND 
25 THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. SO THERE ISN'T ANY 
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1 INDICATION, THEREFORE, OF ANY NEXUS BETWEEN THE THINGS 
2 THAT HE'S WORRIED ABOUT, HIS BUSINESS, AND THE SEXUAL 
3 OFFENDER REGISTRY. 
4 NOW, I HAVE GONE THROUGH ALL THE REASONS WHY 
5 HE, TODAY, TELLS ME HE WANTS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF 
6 GUILTY. EXCEPT FOR THIS ONE ABOUT THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
7 ~ ALLEGED POTENTIAL LOSS OF HIS RIGHT TO BE IN THE 
8 UNITED STATES UPON HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON. 
9 AND I MUST CONSIDER THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF 
10 EVERYTHING HE'S TOLD ME SO FAR TODAY, ALL OF WHICH SO 
11 SERIOUSLY CHALLENGES HIS CREDIBILITY THAT, FRANKLY, THERE 
12 IS NOT A LOT THAT MR. MCFADDEN COULD SAY THAT IS NOT 
13 SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL CHALLENGE ON THE BASIS OF HIS 
14 CREDIBILITY. 
15 I HE TELLS ME THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A 
16 I PLEA TO OF GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN THIS THIS COULD AFFECT HIS 
17 STATUS AS A RESIDENT ALIEN. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT 
18 TESTIMONY. AND FOR THAT REASON ALONE IT IS SUFFICIENT 
19 FOR ME TO DENY THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW ON THOSE GROUNDS. 
20 EACH OF THE GROUNDS THAT HE HAS GIVEN ARE NOT 
21 RECITED IN RULE ELEVEN, WHICH GOES BEYOND THE 
22 CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. NONE OF THE REASONS HE HAS 
23 CITED GIVE RISE TO THE LEVEL OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS THAT 
24 MUST BE DISCLOSED TO A DEFENDANT WHEN TAKING A PLEA. 
25 FOR ALL THE REASONS I HAVE INDICATED HERE 
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1 TODAY, THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA IS DENIED. 
2 NOW, I CAN'T REMEMBER WHAT THE CASE LAW IS LIKE 
3 ON THIS, BUT DOES THIS REQUIRE FINDINGS OF FACT, 
4 CONCLUSION OF LAW, OR A DECREE? OR DO YOU BELIEVE THAT 
5 MY RECITATION OF THE REASONS FOR MY RULING IS SUFFICIENT, 
6 MR. COPE? 
7 MR. COPE: THE STATE'S POSITION IS THAT THE 
8 RECORD THAT'S BEEN MADE BY YOUR REPORTER IS SUFFICIENT. 
9 THE COURT: I MIGHT ADD THAT THERE IS REALLY NO 
10 SUFFICIENT BASIS ON THE RECORD, FACTUAL BASIS, TO SHOW TO 
11 I ME THERE THERE IS ANY RISK WHATSOEVER TO THE DEFENDANT 
12 THAT HE WOULD LOSE HIS RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO RESIDE 
13 SOMEWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES. 
14 I MEAN, WE HAVE AN UNNAMED, UNDEFINED AGENT 
15 COMING OUT TO THE PRISON; NO PETITIONS, NO LETTERS, 
16 NOTHING LIKE THAT. 
17 ANYTHING ELSE? IF NOT, WE ARE IN RECESS. 
18 I (COURT IN RECESS NOW AT 4:12 P. M.) 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JAMES M. COPE, Bar No. 0726 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff, ) OF LAW AND ORDER 
-vs- ) 
Case No. 911900245FS 
SEAN P. MCFADDEN, } 
Hon. Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. ' 
Sean P. McFadden was placed under oath and entered a plea of 
guilty to a single count of Forcible Sexual Abuse on 30 April 
1991, five days after his trial on that charge began. On 20 May 
1991, he was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years at the Utah State 
Prison after the court denied his motions to substitute counsel 
and withdraw his guilty plea. 
Defendant then successfully appealed the district court's 
denial of his motion to substitute counsel. On 28 February 1992, 
James Esparza entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant. 
Twenty-one days later, the defendant claimed the privilege of 
representing himself as co-counsel with Mr. Esparza. On 15 May 
1992, the defendant filed a memorandum outlining the grounds for 
his "Motion to Withdraw Defendant's Guilty Plea". On that same 
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day, the court heard testimony from Mr. McFadden and argument 
from both the State and the defendant regarding the motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
Briefly stated, Mr. McFadden urged the court grant his 
motion because: 
1. When he entered the guilty plea, his defense counsel, 
Lynn Brown, forced him to answer the court's questions in a 
manner not consistent with the truth. 
2. Brown had not told him of the consequences that a 
conviction might have upon his immigration status, insurance 
agent's license and sex offender registry requirements. 
3. If Brown had correctly advised him about the above-
described matters, he would never have plead guilty, but would 
have insisted that his trial go forward to its conclusion. 
FACTS 
There is no evidence that Mr. McFadden will ever be deported 
from the United States. While it is clear that he is 
"deportable" according to federal statute, the record shows that 
absolutely no action has been taken against his resident alien 
status. On the contrary, he retains the ability to apply for 
citizenship at any time. He has been a resident in the United 
States since the age of two and has a parent and several children 
who are United States citizens. 
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There is no evidence that Mr, McFadden has ever been 
registered as a sex offender pursuant to 77-27-21.5 (1) (c). 
McFadden denied that he had ever been registered. There was, on 
30 April 1991, no statutory requirement that a person 
contemplating a plea of guilty to a sexual offense be 
specifically advised about this particular statute. There is no 
evidence that Mr. McFadden has or will suffer any civil or 
criminal disability if he complies with this statute. 
The defendant was aware, on 30 April 1991, that a felony 
conviction would seriously jeopardize his chances of regaining a 
license to sell or broker insurance in the state of Utah. The 
defendant testified to prior dealings with the state licensing 
agency personnel who made him aware of this. 
The defendant did not reveal the grounds for his Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea until he discussed them with James Esparza 
in approximately March 1992. 
During examination by the court and cross-examination by the 
State, the defendant was evasive, self-serving and inconsistent 
with earlier statements to the court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court concludes that 
McFaddenfs testimony is untrustworthy and incredible. It bears 
insufficient indicia of reliability for the court to base any 
factual findings upon it. There is no credible evidence that 
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McFadden's attorney had a duty on 30 April 1991 to inform 
McFadden of the sex offender registry, the renewal of his 
insurance license, or the possibility of his deportation. The 
defendant had just listened to all, or virtually all, of the 
State's evidence in a trial which may have resulted in his 
conviction of a first degree felony with a minimum mandatory 
sentence of 5, 10, or 15 years to life. The defendant entered 
his plea after a full and free discussion with the court about 
its meaning, his state of mind, and his understanding. He said 
he understood, that his decision was voluntary and that he wanted 
to plead guilty. He now says that he lied to the court, that he 
didn't understand, and that he was misled. There is no reason to 
suppose that his latest version is anything but a case of acute 
buyer's remorse conjured up from prison. There is no legal 
reason to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea be and the same hereby is DENIED this day of 
January, 1993. ^^ 
DATED this -ZTst day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
j/Uu+J. (I, fL 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Judge 
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Approved as to form: 
&A < A 
EARL XAIZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law 
And Order was delivered to Earl Xaiz, Attorney for Defendant SEAN 
P. MCFADDEN at 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on the ZlfiH^day of January, 1993. 
FILEO MSTIUCT COURT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff# 
vs. 
SEAN McFADDEN, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 911900245 
This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider Withdrawal of Guilty Plea. That motion is denied for 
the reasons specified below. 
This court adopts the holdings of those cases which do not 
require defense counsel to inform a defendant of potential 
deportation consequences flowing from a guilty plea. The facts of 
this case support the proposition that counsel cannot be expected 
to explain every possible consequence of a guilty plea. Defendant 
in this case has gone so far in his testimony to suggest that his 
defense counsel should have explained that a guilty plea might 
jeopardize his business license issued by the Department of 
Insurance. Furthermore, the affidavit of Hakeem Ishola, submitted 
by defendant himself, indicates only that defendant's status makes 
him "deportable". There is no evidence defendant will in fact be 
deported. 
!V.?62 
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Defendant must not only present evidence of his counsel's 
substandard performance, he must also demonstrate that, but for his 
counsel's failure, he would never have pled guilty. Defendant has 
presented no credible evidence that had he been informed of the 
possibility of deportation he would not have entered a plea of 
guilty. Furthermore, defendant's demeanor and statements at the 
time his plea was tendered and accepted indicated to this court 
that his sole motive was to avoid what he perceived was a likely 
jury verdict of guilt. As a consequence, disclosure of a possible 
deportation would not have changed defendant's decision to plead 
guilty. 
Dated this /b day of November, 19,93;. 
d(Mj} 
MICHAEL Ri, MURPHY .. 
DISTRICT COURT J.UDGE' 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Summary Decision and Order, to the following, this /if 
day of November, 1993: 
James M. Cope 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Earl Xaiz 
Attorney for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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